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Comments and Casenotes
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND MARYLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
By BERNARD S. MEYER*
"If Parliament does not mean what it says, it must say
so"-thus spoke Lord Mildew, in the case of Bluff v. Father
Gray.' Strangely enough, in the course of the passage of
statutes, the legislative bodies often do!
Semantic limitations, considerations of policy, legalistic
adherence to ritualistic forms often require or render more
desirable adumbration of the plan of a statute rather than
enactment of a complete and final system.2 Necessarily,
therefore, legislative history (e. g., the hearings, reports
and debates) is, to an increasingly large extent, the determining factor in the decision whether or in what manner
a particular statute is to be applied.3
An apt illustration of the necessity for use of legislative
history is the relatively short section of the First War
Powers Act, 1941,1 which gave the President power to
* Of the Baltimore City Bar. B.S., 1936, Johns Hopkins University;
LL.B., 1938, University of Maryland; Attorney, Department of the Treasury. (The statements made in this article represent only the personal
views of the author; they do not in any way reflect the official views of
any Government department or officer.)
A. P. HERBERT, UNCOMMON LAW 192.

Thug, the statutory authorization pursuant to which, by administrative
regulation, automobiles, bicycles, tires, typewriters, sugar, and gasoline are
rationed is contained in one relatively short sentence:
"... Whenever the President is satisfied that the fulfillment of
requirements for the defense of the United States will result in a
shortage in the supply of any material or of any facilities for defense
or for private account or for export, the President may allocate such
material or facilities in such manner, upon such conditions and to
such extent as he shall deem necessary or appropriate in the public
interest and to promote the national defense."
Act of May 31, 1941, c. 157, 55 Stat. 236 (Public Law 89, 77th Congress) as
amended by Act of March 27, 1942, c. 199, 56 Stat. - (Public Law 507,
77th Congress) (U. S. C. A. title 41, note preceding section 1).
3 Of 109 cases decided by the Supreme Court from the beginning of the
present term through May 5, 1942, construing or relying on federal or
state statutes, 45, or 41% analyzed or relied on the legislative history of
the statute involved.
'Section 201 of the Act of December 18, 1941, c. 593, 55 Stat. 838; 50
U. S. C. 611. That section provides in pertinent part:
"The President may authorize any department or agency of the
Government exercising functions in connection with the prosecution
of the war effort, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the
President for the protection of the interests of the Government, to
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authorize the making, amendment or modification of contracts without regard to the provisions of law relating
thereto. It is not clear from the language used whether
the modification authorized by the Act requires consent
or not.' But from the legislative history of the Act it is
clear that under the authority of section 201 contracts may
be modified only by consent of both parties. In the course
of the debate in the Senate on December 16, 1941, the following colloquy between Senator Vandenberg and Senator
Van Nuys (the Senator in charge of the bill) occurred:"
"MR. VANDENBERG. Mr. President, may I ask for an
interpretation of the meaning of the words in line
10, page 2, 'or modifications of contracts?' Does that
language mean that the President might change the
price in a contract in any way he saw fit, for anybody,
at any time or place, of course assuming that it would
be in what he believed to be the national interest?
Would this language grant him the right to make any
contract, at any price he pleased, with anybody?
"MR. VAN

Nuys. It would enable him to modify a

contract by consent. Under the present law, a contract cannot be modified even with the consent of both
parties.
"MR. VANDENBERG. Then this language does permit
possible modification of a contract?
"MR. VAN Nuyrs.

By consent of both parties; yes."

In the Federal courts, at least, it seems clear that the
"plain meaning rule"7 no longer prevents resort to legislaenter into contracts and into amendments or modifications of contracts heretofore or hereafter made and to make adgance, progress
and other payments thereon, without regard to the provisions of law
relating to the making, performance, amendment, or modification of
contracts whenever he deems such action would facilitate the
prosecution of the war: . . ."
'While it is not entirely clear, it appears probable that a statutory
requirement that contractors with the Government accept modifications
reasonably imposed is constitutional. Cf. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146, 156 (1919) ; Omnia Commercial
Co., Inc., v. United States, 261 U. S. 502, 508 (1923).
' 88 Cong. Rec. D. I. 10097.
7 That rule is stated by Mr. Justice Butler, in United States v. Missouri
Pacific Railroad Company, 278 U. S. 269, 278 (1929) in the following
language:
" . . where the language of an enactment Is clear and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable
consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final
expression of the meaning intended. And in such cases legislative
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tive materials to aid statutory construction.8 The materials which may be used in determining legislative intention,9 include hearings before the committees of Congress, 0
debates on the floor of the House or Senate," reports of the
Congressional committee to which the bill was referred, 2
amendments made or rejected, 8 statements by the sponsor
history may not be used to support a construction that adds to or
takes from the significance of the words employed. .. ."
Compare with that language the statement of Mr. Justice Reed in his
dissenting opinion in Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co., 314 U. S.
118, 145 (1941) that:
"The courts properly are hesitant to depart from literalism in
interpreting a statute. Strong equities do induce departure from
the ordinary course where the purpose of the Congress appears
plain .... "
United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U. S. 534, 542
(1940) ; United States v. Dickerson, 310 U. S. 554, 561 (1940) ; cf. United
States v. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 62 S. Ct. 445, 449 (U. S. 1942).
"Interesting discussions of the concept of "legislative intention" will be
found in the following articles: Radin, Statutory Interpretation (1930) 43
Harv. L. Rev. 863; Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation" (1930) 43
Harv. L. Rev. 886; Horack, In the Name of Legislative Intention (1932)
38 W. Va. L. Q. 119; de Sloovere, Extrinsie Aids in the Interpretation of
Statutes (1940) 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 527; Jones, Statutorv Doubts and
Legislative Intention (1940) 40 Col. L. Rev. 957.
10 Statements of the author of one of the bills in question made during
hearings were considered by the court in United States, to the use of
Noland Co., Inc., v. Irwin, 62 S. Ct. 899, 902 (U. S. 1942) ; and in United
States v. Rehwald, 44 F. (2d) 663 (D. Cal., 1930) ; hearings generally were
considered in United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U. S.
534, 538, 539, 547 (1940) ; and In Re Drainage District No. 7 of Poinsett
County, Ark., 21 Fed. Supp. 798, 804 (D. Ark., 1937) ; and the use of statements made during hearings by a person who would be responsible for the
exercise of the functions to be conferred was upheld in Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Robert Collier & Co., Inc., 76 F. (2d) 939 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1935). See also O'Hara v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 269 U. S.
364, 367 (1926) ; Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 Fed. Supp. 366, 373
(D. Minn., 1939) aff'd 119 F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941).
11Debates may be used to show common agreement concerning the purpose of legislation: United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 22
(1940) ; Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke,
300 U. S. 440, 464 (1937) ; Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283
U. S. 643, 651 (1931) ; and explanatory statements made in debate by
the committee member in charge of the bill may be used: Wright v. Vinton
Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, loc. cit. supra; United
States v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 278 U. S. 269, 278 (1929) ; Duplex
Printing
Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 475 (1921).
1
,Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke,.
300 U. S. 440, 463 (1937) ; United States v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.,
278 U. S. 269, 278 (1929); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S.
443, 474 (1921).
13 Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402, 410 (1941) (amendment rejected) ; District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U. S. 441, 449 (1941) (amendment rejected) ; United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U. S. 534,
551-553 (1940) (amendment made); Fox v. Standard Oil Company, 294
U. S. 87, 96 (1935) (amendment rejected) ; United States v. Great Northern
Railway Co., 287 U. S. 144, 155 (1932) (amendments made and rejected)
United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U. S. 547, 551 (1921) (amendment rejected)
Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 113 F. (2d) 52, 58 (C. C. A. 8th,
1940) (amendment rejected).
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of an amendment made on the floor of the House or Senate,
or by the draftsman of an act, 4 earlier acts, 5 and the legislative history of a later related act.' 6
Of what value are these extrinsic aids in the construction of an act of the General Assembly of Maryland? While
our Court of Appeals still adheres to the plain meaning
rule, 7 it has stated that: "all agree that the intention of
the Legislature must govern in the construction of all
statutes"," and it has followed legislative intention (i. e.,
purpose rather than meaning) in at least two cases.19 And
while it has stated in dictum in Baltimore Retail Liquor
Package Stores Ass'n., Inc., v. Kerngood ° that, ". . . it is a
mistake to refer the Court to reports of the intention of the
draftsmen, . . .", it has made reference, in construing the
Corporation Law of 1868, to the report of the Commissioners appointed pursuant to the Constitution of 1867 to
frame that law,2 1 has relied on debates of the Constitutional
Convention of 1867 in construing the constitutional provision relating to uniform registration,2 2 and has stated that,
. the courts are not shut off from any discussion or
"Richbourg Motor Company v. United States, 281 U. S. 528, 536 (1930)
(sponsor of amendment) ; United States, to the use of Noland Co., Inc., v.
Irwin; and United States v. Rehwald, both supra, n. 10 (draftsman of act).
15 United States v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354, 357 (1926).
16 In Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lederer, 252 U. S. 523, 538
(1920), the Court refused to consider the legislative history of a later act,
but in United States v. Cooper Corporation, 312 U. S. 600, 612 (1941) the
Court, in construing the Sherman Act, gave consideration to the legislative
history of the Clayton Act. Accord: Pierce v. United States, 62 S. Ct.
237, 239 (U. S., 1941).
See also Neuberger v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 311 U. S. 83, 90 (1940); United States v. American Trucking
Associations, 310 U. S. 534, 550 (1940).
17 Hopper v. Jones, 178 Md. 429, 13 A. (2d) 621 (1940) ; Maryland Agricultural College v. Atkinson, 102 Md. 557, 62 A- 1035 (1906) ; State v.
Archer, 73 Md. 44, 20 A. 172 (1890). The Court has stated in a number
of cases that the "language of a statute is its most natural expositor",
Hopper v. Jones, supra; Frederick Iron & Steel Co. v. Page, 165 Md. 212,
220, 166 A. 738 (1933) ; R. H. Frazier & Son v. Leas, 96 Md. 764, 127 A.
572 (1916) ; Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471, 485 (1854).
18Healy v. State, 115 Md. 377, 80 A. 1074 (1911).
State v. Archer,
supra, n. 17. In the Healy case, the Court added:
"...If the words of the law seem to be of doubtful import, it may
then perhaps become necessary to look beyond them in order to
ascertain what was the legislative mind at the time the law was
enacted, what the circumstances were under which the action was
taken, what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed, and what was
the leading object of the law."
Accord: Maryland Agricultural College v. Atkinson, supra, n. 17.
19Baltimore Retail Liquor Package Stores Ass'n, Inc., v. Kerngood, 171
Md. 426, 189 A. 209 (1937) ; Johnson v. Heald, 33 Md. 352, 372 (1870).
20171 Md. 426, 189 A. 209 (1937).
21Strauss v. Heiss, 48 Md. 292, 296 (1878).
" Bangs v. Fey, 159 Md. 548, 152 A. 508 (193G).
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sources of information available to the Legislature in order
to ascertain the legislative intent".23 In the determination
whether a statute was passed in accordance with the Constitution, when it was to take effect or what its precise
terms were, the Court has permitted use of not only the
legislative Journals, but also oral evidence of the Governor, Senators, Clerks, and other participants in the
legislative act.24
The most recent case touching the point is Taggart,Insurance Commissioner of Pa. v. Mills. 25 In that case it
was urged that Section 2 of Acts of 1941, Chapter 640
(which enacted a one year period of limitations on assessment actions against policyholders in reciprocal insurance
companies) was enacted for the specific purpose of barring
existing causes of action on assessments against policyholders of the Keystone Indemnity Exchange. Concerning
this contention the Court, speaking through Chief Judge
Bond, said:26
"It seems to be assumed in some of the arguments
that this new statute was prepared with the purpose
of barring these very claims on the Exchange assessments. The court would not have any authentic information of the fact, if the fact were relevant. It is
not relevant, for the intention of the legislaturepassing
the act, and that of the Governor signing it, form the
test for construction, and only the understanding of
legislatorsand the Governor examining the act is to be
measured.
"The statute does not, then, contain any expression
of intention that it shall effect pre-existing causes of
action, and the intention cannot be implied, and therefore, under the law as it is laid down for us, there
seems to be no'escape from the conclusion that those
causes are not affected . . ." (Italics supplied.)
23 West v. Sun Cab Co., 160 Md. 476, 154 A. 100 (1931).
Thd Court cited
Bangs v. Fey, supra, n. 22, and LEWIs' SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (2nd Ed.) Sec. 470, as authority for its statement. The section from
Sutherland (which was also relied on in the Baltimore Retail Liquor
Package Stores Ass'n. case) deals generally with the use of proceedings of
the legislature and states in part: "The proceedings of the legislature in
reference to the passage of an act may be taken into consideration in construing the act."
24 County Commissioners of Washington County v. Baker, 141 Md. 623,
119 A. 461 (1922) ; Strauss v. Heiss, supra, n. 21; Legg v. Mayor, Counsellor and Alderman of the City of Annapolis, 42 Md. 203 (1875) ; Berry
v. Baltimore & Drum Point Railroad Co., 41 Md. 446 (1875).
2523 A. (2d) 832 (Md., 1942).
20 Ibid, 836.
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It may fairly be inferred from that language, and from the
statements of the earlier cases set forth above, that subject
to the limitation of the plain meaning rule our Court of
Appeals would consider committee hearings and reports
and legislative debate if those materials existed in obtainable form.
However, under present legislative practice in Maryland, the only method, aside from the words of the statute
itself, of indicating legislative intention is by use of a
preamble.2 7 A substantial factor in the determination of
statutory meaning is, therefore, unavailable. It therefore
seems proper to suggest that the Legislative Council consider the feasibility of modernizing the antiquated Maryland system by providing for the reporting and printing
of legislative hearings, reports and debates.2 8 If it be
argued that the result is not worth the additional expense
involved, it may be answered that that argument is equally
applicable to the printing of the statutes themselves, for
in present legal theory legislative history is as much a part
of the construction of a statute as is the language of the
act itself. Yet, clearly, no one would regard such an argument as tenable.
APPEAL FROM STATE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
COMMISSION BY NON-APPEARING PARTY
Hathcock, et al., v. Loften1
Oxford Cabinet Co. v. Parks2
Two cases, decided on the same day by the Court of
Appeals, deal with the right of appeal from the State Industrial Accident Commission to the courts of record. In
the first case, after the claimants had -filed their petition
before the Commission, the employer applied for a hear2, See, e. g., Md. Laws 1933 Sp., Ch. 104, in the preamble of which the
General Assembly indicated its intention to reverse the holding of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The most common form of preamble is
the "whereas" clause of most repealing statutes, e. g., Md. Laws 1941, Ch.
691. See also the recent case of Shell Oil Co. v. Brownley, Baltimore
Daily Record, June 26, 1942 (Md., 1942), the opinion in which relies, in
part, on the preamble to the statute.
28 Consideration might also well be given to the removal by statute of

the limitation of the plain meaning rule. The anomalies of that rule are
well presented in Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsio Aids in the
Interpretationof Federal Statutes (1939) 25 Wash. U. L. Q. 2; Note (1937)
50 Harv. L. Rev. 822.
122 A.
A. (2d)
(2d) 481
479 (Md.,
(Md., 1942).
1942).
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